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Two kinds of definites in numeral classifier languages *
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UC Berkeley
Abstract Numeral classifier languages distinguish definite noun phrases licensed
by uniqueness from those licensed by familiarity. Unique definites are expressed by
bare nouns or null pronouns, while familiar definites are expressed by indexicals
such as demonstrative descriptions or overt pronouns. This generalization parallels
the observation by Schwarz (2009) that German distinguishes unique versus familiar
or anaphoric definiteness in its article system. The difference between the two kinds
of definites can be reduced to the presence of a semantic index in the case of familiar
definites. As familiar definites occur in most E-type contexts, including donkey
anaphora, and uniqueness definites are not possible in these contexts, these facts
provide support to dynamic analyses of E-type anaphora and pose problems for
uniqueness-based approaches, such as the theory of Elbourne (2013).
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1 Introduction
A longstanding debate in the analysis of definiteness is whether it is better charac-
terized by reference to uniqueness, familiarity, or some mix of the two (Heim 1982,
1990; Kadmon 1990; Roberts 2003). A less popular view is that uniqueness and
familiarity are independently necessary to account for separate classes of definite
expressions (Birner & Ward 1994; Poesio & Viera 1998). While non-unified views
of definiteness in English have been viewed skeptically (e.g., Abbott 1999), recent
cross-linguistic work has added grist to the mill of the non-uniformity view. For
example, Schwarz (2009) demonstrates that German has two semantically distinct
definite articles, a weak article licensed by uniqueness and a strong article licensed
by familiarity, where the relevant notion of familiarity is what Roberts (2003) calls
strong familiarity, licensed by prior mention in a text or conversation.
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In this paper, I show that the realization of definiteness in numeral classifier
languages provides further support for the independent necessity of uniqueness and
familiarity. The basic generalization is as follows:
(1) In many numeral classifier languages:
a. Unique definites are realized as bare nouns
b. Familiar definites are realized as demonstratives or overt pronouns
While this generalization is exemplified below with Thai, the same facts seem to
hold in Mandarin Chinese, Korean (e.g., Lee 1995), and Japanese (e.g., Kurafuji
1999, 2004). The generalization does not extend to numeral classifier languages
such as Cantonese and Bangla, which mark definiteness with classifiers (Cheng &
Sybesma 1999; Dayal 2012), or languages such as Yi (Nuosu), which has a definite
article (Jiang 2012). While the facts in these latter languages will be different, one
must eventually ask what type of definiteness is realized by the relevant markers in
these languages as well.
Below I outline four environments which constitute unique definites, mostly
following Schwarz (2009). These include larger situation definites, weak definites,
immediate situation definites, and some cases of bridging. These environments form
a unified class in that they do not require any explicit linguistic antecedent. Envi-
ronments which are licensed by linguistic antecedents constitute cases of familiar
definites. In these environments, which include donkey sentences, bare nouns are
prohibited. As bare nouns are licensed by uniqueness, the inability of bare nouns to
occur as donkey anaphora raises issues for theories which rely only on uniqueness
to achieve out-of-scope binding in donkey sentences (Heim 1990; Elbourne 2013).
My analysis below hews to that of Schwarz (2009) in most respects. While
uniqueness definites denote the unique individual in a particular (minimal) situation,
anaphoric definites contain an additional semantic argument, a dynamic index.
This analysis makes the right predictions in ‘pronoun of laziness’ contexts, as bare
nominals but not indexical expressions receive sloppy interpretations. This final
observation is reminiscent of Kurafuji’s (1998) finding that Japanese null pronouns
prefer sloppy readings in these contexts while overt pronouns only allow strict
readings. I show that Kurafuji’s generalization follows if the uniqueness versus
familiarity distinction described above is mirrored in whether pronouns are covert or
overt.
2 Numeral classifier languages and definiteness
In the literature on the semantics of nominals in numeral classifier languages, it is
easy to find examples such as the following, with bare nouns translated as definites
(this and all following examples are from Thai):
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(2) maˇa
dog
kamlaN
PROG
hàw.
bark
‘The dog is barking.’
Such examples constitute the standard evidence for the claim that bare nouns in
these languages can be definite. Such a claim has been made, for example, for
Thai (e.g., Piriyawiboon 2010), Mandarin (e.g., Cheng & Sybesma 1999), Japanese
(e.g., Kurafuji 2004), and Korean (e.g., Kim 2005). Most of the cited works treat
definiteness as a unified class, and provide simple examples such as (2) to establish
this claim.1
Interestingly, demonstratives in classifier languages are sometimes claimed to
mark definiteness as well (e.g., Chen 2004 for Mandarin; Lee 1995 for Korean).
However, the consistency test of Löbner (1985) shows that demonstratives are not
translational equivalents of definite articles (Piriyawiboon 2010: 49):
(3) dèk
child
khon
CLF
nán
that
nOOn
sleep
yùu
IMPF
tE`E
but
dèk
child
khon
CLF
nán
that
mâi.dâi
NEG
nOOn
sleep
yùu.
IMPF
‘That child is sleeping but that child is not sleeping.’ (cf. #the)
Putting together the observation that bare nouns can receive definite interpreta-
tions and the observation that demonstratives are not translational equivalents of
definite articles, the consensus seems to be that “classifier languages do not mark
definiteness” (Jiang 2012: p. 15). But many questions remain. What is the nature of
the definite interpretation of bare nouns? And in what contexts do demonstratives
function as definites?
Enter recent work establishing a robust cross-linguistic contrast between unique-
ness and familiarity definites across languages. Observations that some definite
articles are anaphoric date back at least to Greenberg 1978, but the distribution of
such articles have not been systematically tested in the contexts of most interest to
formal semanticists. In this regard, Schwarz (2009) provides a benchmark for future
crosslinguistic work on definiteness, demonstrating that whether or not definite
articles in German can be contracted with prepositions corresponds to their definite
semantics: while unique definite environments require contraction (‘weak definites’),
familiar definite environments systematically require the full definite article (‘strong
definites’). More recent work has expanded these observations. For example, Arkoh
& Matthewson (2013) show that the Fante determiner -nU only occurs in familiar
environments, with bare nouns occurring in uniqueness contexts (though the latter
claim remains implicit in their paper). In addition, Schwarz (2013) identifies several
1 Lee (1995) is an exception in this regard, as he suggests that the generalization which I demonstrate
below for Thai holds for Korean, namely, that bare nouns are unique definites and demonstratives
noun phrases are anaphoric. Yet his paper lacks the data to clearly establish this generalization.
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other languages with a similar contrast, including Lakhota, which is claimed to have
two separate articles for unique versus familiar definites.2
Here I demonstrate that the distinction between unique versus familiar defi-
nites also accounts for the distribution of bare nouns and definite demonstratives in
many numeral classifier languages: bare nouns are licensed by uniqueness, while
demonstratives occur in familiar environments. Once the linguistic context is ap-
propriately controlled, this distinction is brought into sharp relief. I conclude that
the contrast is hard-wired into the semantics of the relevant nominal expressions:
demonstratives occur in anaphoric definite environments, while bare nouns are sys-
tematically prohibited in these environments, and demonstratives are prohibited in
definite environments licensed by uniqueness. Thus, the uniqueness vs. familiarity
contrast is systematically reflected in the nominal morphosyntax of numeral classifier
languages.
3 Bare nouns as unique definites
There are four distinct uses of bare nouns as definites in numeral classifier lan-
guages: larger situation definites, weak definites, immediate situation definites,
and part-whole bridging. These uses are labeled unique definite environments by
Schwarz (2009), who observes that they only permit weak articles in German. While
uniqueness characterizes most of these environments, they are also unified in that
in all cases the non-linguistic context suffices to identify the referent of the rele-
vant noun phrase, in contrast with the familiar definites discussed in the following
section. Below I introduce the four uniqueness-based uses of bare nouns. After
providing examples of bare nouns in each of the four environments below, I discuss
the prospects for extending Schwarz’s (2009) situation-based analysis to bare nouns.
3.1 Larger situation definites
First, bare nouns in numeral classifier languages are used with larger situation
definiteness (Hawkins 1978), a category where uniqueness is licensed by general
knowledge. For example, the sun, moon, sky, and weather are known to be unique
in all real-world contexts, and as such allow bare nouns:
(4) duaN-can (#duaN nán)
moon (CLF that)
sa`wa`aN
bright
mâak.
very
‘The moon is very bright.’
2 Uniqueness and familiarity may not even be sufficient to account for the range of definiteness
semantics across languages. Barlew (2014) argues that the notion of salience is necessary to account
for the distribution of a definite article in Bulu, a Bantu language of Cameroon.
106
Two kinds of definites in numeral classifier languages
Likewise, predicates which are known to be unique due to common cultural or social
knowledge are translated with bare nouns. For example, once equipped with the
knowledge that Thai provinces elect one Senator and two Ministers of Parliament,
the following contrast obtains:
(5) sOˇO-wOO chiaN-ma`y (#khon nán)
senator Chiang Mai CLF that
gròot
angry
mâak.
very
‘The/#That Senator from Chiang Mai is very angry.’
(6) sOˇO-sOˇO chiaN-ma`y #(khon nán)
M.P. Chiang Mai CLF that
gròot
angry
mâak.
very
‘#The/That M.P. from Chiang Mai is very angry.’
These examples show that demonstrative descriptions are allowed whenever bare
nouns are not. When the predicate is not unique, such as ‘that M.P. from Chiang
Mai,’ a demonstrative is possible, but demonstratives are infelicitous when they pick
out individuals that are known to be unique. Thus, if a predicate is only true for a
single individual regardless of context, it will be translated with a bare noun.
3.2 Weak definites
The second use of bare nouns is with weak definites (Poesio 1994; Barker 2005;
Carlson, Sussman, Klein & Tananhaus 2006), illustrated below:
(7) Sùthêep
Su.
phaa
take
Soˇmchay
So.
pay
go
(thîi)
to
rooN-phayabaan
hospital
‘Suthep took Somchai to the hospital.’
(8) # Sùthêep
Su.
phaa
take
Soˇmchay
So.
pay
go
*(thîi)
to
t1`k
building
‘Suthep took Somchai to the building.’
Even if we do not know which hospital Suthep took Somchai to, ‘hospital’ can be
definite in English. On the other hand, ‘building’ is odd as a definite description out
of context. Here, the hospital is a weak defintie in English, and it is translated with a
bare noun in numeral classifier languages. Other weak definites include the objects
of predicates such as listening to the radio and opening the blinds.
Because they pattern with unique definites, it is surprising that weak definites do
not actually require uniqueness. In fact, weak definites are surprising in several other
respects as well. Poesio (1994) shows that possessive weak definites are possible
in existential sentences, and Carlson et al. (2006) show that weak definites show
the same kind of quantificational variability that indefinites do. Weak definites also
have a restricted grammatical distribution. They are typically internal arguments,
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and often license preposition omission, both indications that they are somewhat
incorporated into the predicate. Schwarz (2014) provides an analysis of weak
definites which relies on uniqueness relevant to an event, while Aguilar-Guevara
& Zwarts (2010) argue that weak definites involve reference to kinds. Setting the
question of their proper analysis aside, it is important that weak definites pattern
reliably with uniqueness definites in classifier languages in requiring bare nouns.
3.3 Immediate situation definites
The third environment where definite bare nouns must be used in the relevant
classifier languages is in immediate situation definites, another term from Hawkins
1978. Like larger situation definites, immediate situation definites rely on shared
knowledge between the speaker and hearer, but this knowledge is specific to a
particular situation or context. Consider the following examples:
(9) rót
car
yùu
LOC
thîi-naˇi?
place-which
‘Where the car?’
(10) maˇa
dog
kamlaN
PROG
hàw.
bark
‘The dog is barking.’
Cars and dogs are only unique relative to specific individuals or households, so the
use of a bare noun to refer to these entities assumes a certain amount of familiarity
with the speaker’s circumstances. Provided such familiarity obtains, the bare noun
can felicitously be used in these contexts. Immediate situation definites occur
constantly in daily life, but used in isolation in a linguistics paper, they rely on the
imagination of the reader to evoke a suitable context where there is exactly one
relevant individual who satisfies the descriptive content of the noun.
3.4 Bridging
The fourth environment where definite bare nouns occur is in some cases of bridging,
also called associative anaphora (Hawkins 1978) or inferrables (Prince 1981). Bridg-
ing definites are licensed by virtue of their association with a linguistic antecedent,
for instance, a possession or authorship relation. Schwarz (2009) shows that only
cases of bridging in German pattern licensed by inalienable, part-whole possession
pattern as unique definites, while cases of bridging licensed by a producer-product
association pattern as familiar/anaphoric definites.3 The same pattern obtains in
3 Schwarz reports some variation among specific examples and between speakers. I have not conducted
a systematic survey, but the native speakers of numeral classifier languages I have consulted with
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numeral classifier languages, as the examples below demonstrate:
(11) rót
car
khan
CLF
nán
that
thùuk
ADV.PAS
tamrùat
police
sàkàt
intercept
phrO´P
because
mâj.dâj
NEG
tìt
attach
satik@@
sticker
wáj
keep
thîi
at
thábian (#baj nán).
license CLF that
‘That car was stopped by police because there was no sticker on the license.’
(12) POOl
Paul
khít
thinks
wâa
COMP
klOOn
poem
bòt
CLF
nán
that
prO´P
melodious
mâak,
very,
mEˆE-waˆa
although
kháw
3P
cà
IRR
mâj
NEG
chOˆOp
like
náktE`ENklOOn #(khon nán).
poet CLF that
‘Paul thinks that poem is beautiful, though he doesn’t really like the poet.’
In (11), thábian ‘license (plate)’ is licensed by virtue of its part-whole relationship
with the antecedent rót ‘car.’ This is an instance of part-whole bridging, and a bare
noun is possible for the bridged definite. In contrast, náktE`ENklOOn ‘poet’ in (12) is
the author of its antecedent klOOn ‘poem,’ and a demonstrative must be used.
Schwarz (2009) offers a perspicuous explanation for why these two instances of
bridging pattern differently:
. . . when considering wholes and their parts, it is clear that there
is a containment relationship between the two, which in turn ensures
that whenever we are looking at a situation that contains the whole,
it will also contain the part. This is not the case for the relationship
between products and their producers. A situation containing a book
does not generally contain the book’s author (p. 54).
So for (11), in any situation where there is a unique car, there will be a unique license
plate. Because there is a contextually unique license plate, the bare noun is available.
However, poems do not contain poets, so the poet in (12) is not contextually unique.
The demonstrative that is required for the bridged definite in (12) indicates that
‘that poet’ is an anaphoric definite. This is unexpected because the poet has not been
mentioned prior in the discourse, and as we will see in the following section, a prior
mention requirement holds for the other cases of anaphoric definiteness. Schwarz
presents compelling arguments from German that the ‘producers’ such as the poet
in (12) in producer-product bridging are necessarily relational nouns. On the basis
of this generalization, Schwarz argues that the indexical argument of anaphoric
definites (see example (20)) is satisfied not by an index which identifies the producer,
but rather its relatum, the product. While a complete analysis of producer-product
have relatively clear judgments in these examples.
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bridging is beyond the scope of this paper, the similarity of the different types of
bridging in numeral classifier languages to the different types of bridging in German
provides compelling evidence that the two phenomena are closely related.
3.5 Uniqueness and the semantics of bare nouns
Schwarz (2009) proposes the following interpretation for unique definite articles:
(13) Unique definite articles (Schwarz 2009: 148)JtheuniqueKg = λ sr.λP : ∃!xP(x)(sr).ιx[P(x)(sr)]
Under such a view, definite articles are functions from a situation and a predicate
into the unique individual that satisfies that predicate in that situation (Heim 1990;
Cooper 1995; Elbourne 2013). The relevant notion of situation is a technical one:
situations are parts of worlds, and can be minimal situations, containing a single
individual and their contextually relevant properties (Kratzer 1989, 2007). The
domain of noun phrases is restricted by a resource situation (sr) (Schwarz 2012).
Thus, in the immediate situation definites in (9) and (10), the resource situation of
the relevant noun phrases contains a single dog or car. In a part-whole bridging
example such as (11), because the resource situation contains a single car, we can
infer that it contains a single license plate as well.
Schwarz extends his analysis to larger situation uses, drawing a parallel between
part-whole bridging and relational larger situation definites like mayor, which intro-
duce arguments (e.g., of Oakland) which entail the existence of a unique referent for
their predicate. Globally unique situation definites like the sun and the sky are the
easy cases, as they are always unique relative to the actual world, of which every
actual situation is a subpart. The environment which does not naturally fall out
of Schwartz’s analysis is weak definites. Schwarz (2009: 73) suggests that weak
definites may be instances of kind reference (Dayal 2004), and that uniqueness is
licensed by virtue of the uniqueness of a particular kind.
While the logical form in (13) may capture aspects of the semantics of bare
nouns in numeral classifier languages, it is not clear where this meaning comes
from. Bare nouns in these languages allow a range of readings outside of unique
definite ones, including kind-level and scopeless indefinite readings (e.g., Yang
2001; Piriyawiboon 2010; Jenks 2011). What gives rise to the definite reading? An
obvious hypothesis is that the unique definite reading arises from a phonologically
silent definite article equivalent to (13) (see Simpson 2005; Wu & Bodomo 2009).
Alternatively, one could attribute the unique definite interpretation to a semantic
type-shifting operator (Chierchia 1998; Dayal 2004).
An alternative proposal adopted by a number of recent authors is that definite
readings for bare nouns are instances of contextually-restricted kind reference (Dayal
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2011; Jenks 2011; Trinh 2011; Jiang 2012). Under such a view, the bare definite dog
would have the interpretation in (14), where DOG represents the dog kind:
(14) Jdog Kg = λ sr.DOG(sr)
This analysis builds on the proposal that nouns in numeral-classifier languages
are kind-referring, and hence that numeral classifiers are needed in order to pull
individual atoms from the kinds (Krifka 1995, 2003; Chierchia 1998). As a kind
is the largest set of individuals which satisfies a certain property within a world or
situation, bare nouns would be expected to have unique definite interpretations.
There are two challenges for this kind-based view of definiteness. The first is
that the kind-based analysis above is not presuppositional. Yet bare nouns in opaque
contexts such as negation nevertheless allow two readings, one of which seems to
include an existence presupposition:
(15) phoˇm
I
mâj
NEG
chOˆOp
like
maˇa.
dog
i. ‘I don’t like dogs.’
ii. ‘I don’t like the dog(s).’
Similarly, Russell’s (1905) King of France sentences and their negation induce the
same uneasiness in Thai that their English equivalents do:
(16) # kàsàt
king
fara`Nse`t
France
(mâj)
NEG
huˇa-láan.
head-bald
‘The king of France is (not) bald.’
A second challenge faced by a kind-based analysis of definite bare nouns is
typological. The four environments for unique definites do not pattern together in
all classifier languages. Specifically, Cantonese bare nouns can be used for weak
definites and larger situation uses, but not for immediate situation uses or part-whole
bridging, which require a bare classifier.4 Such a restriction corresponds to a natural
boundary in the landscape of uniqueness: while larger situation definites and weak
definites can occur in any context, immediate situation definites and part-whole
bridging rely on contextually specific domain restrictions. This observation follows
once uniqueness definites are further split into two subtypes: general definites, com-
prised of larger situation uses and weak definites, and specific definites, comprised
of immediate situation uses and part-whole bridging. If we take general definites
to correspond to instances of kind reference, following Aguilar-Guevara & Zwarts
(2010), then immediate situation uses must involve more than kind reference, and
hence the kind-based denotation in (14) is insufficient.
4 These facts are detailed in ongoing work, Jenks 2015. Suggestions to similar effects can be found in
Li & Bisang 2012 and Li 2013.
111
Peter Jenks
In summary, Schwarz’s (2009) situation-based analysis of unique definites can be
extended to numeral classifier languages with little change, with weak definites being
an instance of kind reference. Under such an analysis, the definite interpretation can
be attributed to a null determiner or type-shift. Another possibility for analyzing
unique definites is to analyze them as instances as kind reference restricted to a
particular situation. However, the latter view must account for the ambiguity of bare
nouns in opaque contexts and fails to account for further cross-linguistic differences
in the distribution of definite bare nouns in numeral classifier languages.
4 Indexicals as anaphoric definites
This section surveys environments in which definite descriptions can be used felici-
tously in a language like English but which cannot be translated with bare nouns in
numeral classifier languages. To my knowledge, the existence of such environments
has not been previously noted. In these environments, languages like Thai and Man-
darin require the use of either a pronoun or a demonstrative. These environments are
all discourse anaphoric, or strongly familiar in the terminology of Roberts (2003),
meaning that they all make reference back to an explicit linguistic antecedent.5
These environments exhibit substantial overlap with the environments for E-type
uses of pronouns, including classical cases of donkey anaphora.
4.1 Indexical definites as E-type anaphora
The narrative sequence below contains an E-type anaphor, the label given to appar-
ent instances of binding without c-command by Evans (1977, 1980). In numeral
classifier languages, these anaphoric contexts require a demonstrative description or
pronoun (null or overt)6; bare nouns cannot be used in these contexts:
(17) a. m1awaan
Yesterday
phoˇm
1ST
c@@
meet
kàp
with
nákrian khon n1N.
student CLF INDEF
‘Yesterday I met a student.’
b. i. (nákrian) khon nán
student CLF that
/
/
(kháw)
3P
chalàat
clever
mâak.
very
‘That student/(s)he was very clever.’
5 The one exception to this generalization is the producer-product bridging examples discussed in the
previous section. I will not deal with such cases here, but recall the suggestion by Schwarz (2009)
that in such cases the linguistic antecedent is the relatum of the bridged definite.
6 Here and below, both overt and null pronouns are possible. However, null and overt pronouns have
different meanings, as has been shown by Kurafuji (1998, 1999). See section 4.3 for discussion.
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ii. # nákrian
student
chalàat
clever
mâak.
very
‘Students are clever.’
These examples are classic problems for purely quantificational theories of indef-
inites in that the indefinite seems to bind a pronoun (or demonstrative) beyond its
scope. Such examples are among the major motivations for dynamic theories of
semantics (Kamp 1981; Heim 1982), in which indefinites assign indices to novel
discourse referents, contextually salient individuals which can be referred to by
subsequent definite noun phrases, such as definite descriptions and pronouns. In
numeral classifier languages, indexical expressions such as pronouns and demon-
stratives must be used in such discourse anaphoric contexts, providing relatively
straightforward support for dynamic approaches. The novel finding is that bare
nouns in numeral classifier languages cannot be used as discourse anaphora.7 In
such an environment, the bare noun is restricted to a generic interpretation.
The restriction on anaphoric bare nouns holds regardless of whether an individ-
ual’s identity is known. The following examples illustrate this observation (modeled
after Elbourne 2005, p. 6):
(18) a. phûu-chaay khon n1N
man CLF INDF
khâa
kill
Suthêep.
Suthep.
‘A mani killed Suthep j.’
b. i. tamruat
police
soˇNsaˇy
suspect
wâa
COMP
phûu-chaay khon na´n
man CLF that
/
/
(khaˇw)
3P
dây-ráp
receive
bàat-cèp
injury
tOOn-na´n
time-that
‘Police suspect that that mani / hei was injured at the time.’
ii. tamruat
police
soˇNsaˇy
suspect
wâa
COMP
phûu-chaay
man
dây-ráp
receive
bàat-cèp
injury
tOOn-na´n.
time-that
‘Police suspect that a mank was injured at the time.’
As before, indexical definites can be used in such an example, but bare nouns cannot.
Interestingly, when a bare noun identical to the antecedent is used in these examples,
it implies the existence of a third man distinct from the murderer and Suthep.
7 This claim needs qualification: in longer narratives, it is possible to find a bare noun being used in
putatively anaphoric contexts. Such uses typically commence after an individual has been established
and it is clear that they are the only individual of the relevant type, i.e., they are unique. While I do
not have space to illustrate such cases, I think that they ultimately provide further support for the
generalization proposed in this paper in that it is only once uniqueness has been clearly established
for a particular noun that the bare noun can be used. My hunch is that these uses are essentially
equivalent to proper names in languages like English.
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One possible explanation for why anaphoric bare nouns seem to be impossible
in the examples above is that the uniqueness presupposition which is characteristic
of bare nominal definites is not met. For example, the indefinite in (17) implies that
other students are around, and at least two men are present in (18). However, the
same facts hold for anaphora to universal quantifiers, as in the following example:
(19) a. nákrian thúk khon
student every CLF
sO`Op
test
tòk
fail
m1ˆawaan.
yesterday
‘Every student failed the test yesterday.’
b. i. daN-na´n
so
nákrian phûak nán
student GROUP that
/
/
(phûak-khaˇw)
GROUP-3P
kOˆO-l@@i
thus
phìt-waˇN
disappointed
mâak.
very
‘So the students / they were very disappointed.’
ii. daN-na´n
so
nákrian
student
kOO-l@@i
thus
phìt-waˇN
disappointed
mâak.
very
‘Students are disappointed.’
Plural anaphora in Thai typically make use of a special plural morpheme phûak,
roughly ‘group’, which can be anaphoric to a universal quantifier, as (19b-i) shows.
Yet while a bare noun can freely refer to a plurality, and often does, a bare noun
cannot be used as an anaphor to a universal quantifier. This observation defuses
the uniqueness-based explanation for the unavailability of anaphoric bare nouns in
examples (17) and (18); there is only one contextually relevant group of students in
(19), and a bare noun still cannot be used to refer back to this group.
4.2 The indexical semantics of anaphoric definites
Schwarz (2009) argues that the semantics of anaphoric definites are identical to
the semantics of unique definites with the exception of an additional individual
argument position. The additional argument is saturated by an index that picks out a
contextually salient discourse referent:
(20) Anaphoric definite articles (Schwarz 2009, p. 260):JtheanaphoricKg = λ sr.λP.λy : ∃!xP(x)(sr)∧ x = y.ιx[P(x)(sr)∧ x = y]
The requirement that familiar definites must take a dynamic index as an argument
connects with the observation that the indexical expressions which occur as familiar
definites can also be used for direct ostension, in which case pointing serves as the
index and its assignment (Roberts 2002).8 The presence of an indexical argument on
8 For now, I am treating pronouns and both distal and proximal demonstratives the same, with (20) as
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familiar definites is expected in dynamic approaches, which take E-type anaphora to
achieve reference by virtue of an index interpreted relative to an assignment function.
The case of a plural anaphor to a universal or proportional quantifier as in (19) can
be given a similar analysis, where the plurality which is identified by the domain
restriction of the universal quantifier is accessible to subsequent reference.
However, alternative approaches to definiteness eschew the indices which are
necessary to make dynamic semantics work (e.g., Elbourne 2013), relying exclu-
sively on situationally-restricted uniqueness. Under such a view, if a situation is
small enough, it will only contain that individual which was identified by the earlier
expression. Thus, the logical form of the subject of The student was clever, say, as a
continuation to the English gloss of (17a) would be the unique students in s1, where
s1 is the situation described in the preceding clause.
However, we have already seen that bare nouns cannot be used anaphorically in
these contexts, despite the fact that bare nominal definites are freely allowed in other
contexts licensed by uniqueness. This is unexpected for the idea that all definites
are fundamentally uniqueness definites. So, I conclude, some definite expressions in
numeral classifier languages are inherently indexical, and these are the expressions
which occur with familiar or anaphoric uses of definites.
4.3 Pronouns of laziness
In the anaphoric contexts above, bare nominals are prohibited, while demonstratives
and both overt and null pronouns are available. However, in ‘pronoun of laziness’
contexts, such as paycheck sentences (Karttunen 1969), null pronouns pattern with
bare nouns. More specifically, indexical definites in paycheck sentences pick out
the individual referred to by the antecedent, not its sense, while bare nouns and null
pronouns pattern together in permitting the covarying or sloppy readings that these
sentences are famous for:
(21) a. phuˆu-chaai
man
thîi
REL
fàak
entrust
N@@n-d1an
salary
wáy
PRFV
kàp
with
mia
wife
chalàat
smart
kwàa. . .
CMPR
‘The mani who entrusts hisi paycheck to his wife is smarter than. . .
b. i. # phûu-chaai
man
thîi
REL
fàak
entrust
N@@n-d0an kOˆOn na´n
paycheck CLF that
/ man
it
wáy
PRFV
kàp
with
mia-nóoy].
mistress
. . . the man who entrusts [that paycheck] j / it j to his mistress.’
their semantic core. They may be further distinguished by additional presuppositions that each lexical
item introduces. For example, Roberts (2004) proposes that pronouns include additional salience
presuppositions.
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ii. phûu-chaai
man
thîi
REL
fàak
entrust
(N@@n-d1an)
salary
wáy
PRFV
kàp
LINK
mia-nóoy.
mistress
. . . the man j who entrusts his j paycheck to his mistress.’
(22) a. pii-níi
year-this
naayók
Prime Minister
pen
PRED
samaˇachík
member
ph0ˆa-Thai.
pro-Thai.
‘This year the prime ministeri is a pro-Thai party member.
b. i. # Pii-nâa
year-next
khaˇw
3P
/
/
naayók khon nán
P. M. CLF that
cà
FUT
pen
PRED
samaˇachík-P.Ch.P.
member-democrat
‘Next year hei / that P.M.i will be a democratic party member.’
ii. Pii-nâa
year-next
(naayók)
Prime Minister
cà
FUT
pen
PRED
samaˇachík-P.Ch.P.
member-democrat
‘Next year he j will be a democratic party member.’
In these contexts, the same indexical expression which was required in the familiar
contexts above must receive a strict interpretation: in (21) the paycheck given to
wife and mistress is literally the same paycheck, even if given by a different man,
and the Prime Minister who will be in a different party next year in (22) must be
the current Prime Minister. In these contexts, however, both bare nouns and null
pronouns allow the sloppy interpretation, where the paycheck or Prime Minister
changes with the situation.
Kurafuji (1998, 1999) observes the same contrast for null versus overt pronouns
in Japanese. He analyzes overt pronouns in Japanese as dynamically bound in-
dexicals, consistent with the analysis here, while null pronouns are analyzed as
functions from situations or individuals to the maximum individual in that situation,
his ‘E-type pronouns’, following Chierchia (1992, 1995).9
If Japanese patterns with Thai and Mandarin in having two kinds of definite
expressions, the different interpretations of null versus overt pronouns identified
by Kurafuji are just special cases of unique versus familiar definiteness outlined
above. Crucially, the functional semantics that Chierchia (1992, 1995) proposes for
sloppy interpretations of pronouns and definites can be reduced to the uniqueness-
based semantics of bare nouns, functions from situations to the maximal, or unique,
individual in the given situation.10
So the noun N@@n-d1an ‘salary’ and its null pronominal equivalent in (21) are
interpreted as functions from situations into the (unique) paycheck in the relevant
9 There is a terminological issue here, as Chierchia and Kurafuji use ‘E-type pronoun’ in a narrower
sense than the original one to refer exclusively to ‘pronouns of laziness,’ i.e., those pronouns and
definite descriptions with functional meanings that result in sloppy readings.
10 A similar proposal has been made for German pronouns, which Grosz & Patel (To appear) argue are
parasitic on the two types of definite articles: personal pronouns are the anaphoric version of German
weak articles while demonstrative pronouns are the anaphoric version of German strong articles.
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situation. All that is needed to ensure the sloppy reading in the second clause
is that the two occurrences of the noun are interpreted relative to two separate
situations.11 Similarly, naayók ‘Prime Minister’ in (22) is interpreted as a function
from situations to the unique P.M. in that situation. Because the two clauses are
interpreted at different times, hence, different situations, the noun can refer to two
distinct individuals. In contrast, the indexical expression must refer to an existing
discourse referent. In both examples, the only available discourse referent is the
individual introduced in the first clause. As such, using the indexical expression in
this environment results in the bizarre strict reading.
One complication is that null pronouns are possible in all E-type environments,
including contexts that prohibit bare nouns such as the narrative sequences in section
4.1. To account for the broad availability of null pronouns, Kurafuji proposed that
they are ambiguous between indexical and functional interpretations. I can see two
ways of accommodating Kurafuji’s ambiguity proposal in light of the facts described
above. The first is to analyze the apparent ambiguity of null pronouns as syntactic
ambiguity between a bare noun or a pronoun which is concealed by NP-ellipsis. This
approach avoids positing ambiguity in any lexical expressions, shifting the burden
of explanation for ambiguity to the syntactic component. Under such a view, it can
be maintained that situational-binding is never used in anaphoric environments.
The second way to account for the wide availability of null pronouns would
be to admit that uniqueness definites can be used in familiar contexts, but there
are discourse restrictions on bare nouns which do not apply to null pronouns, even
though they can both receive functional, uniqueness-based interpretations. Recall
that bare nouns qua unique definites are often discourse-new, in the sense of Prince
(1992) (though see fn. 7); it may be that there is a novelty condition on bare nominal
definites akin to the one proposed for indefinites by Heim (1982).
4.4 Donkey sentences
We turn last to donkey anaphora (Geach 1962). As in the other cases of E-type
anaphora, donkey anaphora seem to be bound by an earlier indefinite despite failing
to occur in its scope. But donkey anaphora are distinguished from the earlier cases
of E-type anaphora in that they receive covarying interpretations relative to a c-
commanding quantifier. In numeral classifier languages, donkey anaphora pattern as
familiar definites, and can only be realized as indexical expressions:
11 One interesting argument for this kind of semantics is that the two occurrences of the noun can have
different interpretations with respect to plurality. Chierchia (1995: 115) notes that this is a signature
property of ‘E-type pronouns’ (pronouns of laziness). Thus, the truth of example (21) is not affected
by how many paychecks the two men give to their wives or mistresses. As bare nouns in classifier
languages are number-neutral, this follows directly.
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(23) [chaawnaa
farmer
thúk
every
khon
CLF
thîi
that
mii
have
khwaai tua n1N1
buffalo CLF INDEF
] tii
hit
khwaai tua nán1
buffalo CLF that
/
/
?(man)1
it
‘Every farmer that has a buffalo hits it.’
(24) [chaawnaa
farmer
thúk
every
khon
CLF
thîi
that
mii
have
khwaai tua n1N1
buffalo CLF INDEF
] tii
hit
khwaai∗1/gen
buffalo
‘Every rice farmer that has a buffalo hits buffalo.’ (a generic claim)
When bare nouns can felicitously occur in the position of a donkey anaphor, they
can only receive generic interpretations. While such a generic reading is certainly
compatible with each farmer beating his own buffalo, such a state-of-affairs is not
entailed by the sentence in (24).
From the perspective of dynamic semantics, the requirement that donkey anaphora
be indexical expressions is again as expected. Dynamic theories take donkey
anaphora to be bound dynamic indices whose assignment varies along with the
c-commanding quantifier. Such theories overcome the lack of c-command in don-
key sentences by enriching the semantics of connectives such that the information
introduced by the first conjunct can dynamically bind variables in the second (e.g.,
Groenendijk & Stokhof 1991; Chierchia 1995).
As before, uniqueness-based theories incorrectly predict that definite bare nouns
in classifier languages should be able to occur as donkey anaphora. To see why this
is so, consider the situation-based truth conditions for donkey sentences proposed
by Elbourne (2013); the donkey anaphor is underlined:12
(25) a. Every man who owns a donkey beats the donkey.
b. In every situation s1 where a man owns a donkey, there is another situation
s2, s2 a subpart of s1, in which the man in s2 beats the unique donkey in s2.
Here the heavy lifting is done by the part-whole relationship between situations,
entailed by the semantics of the universal quantifier. Because the unique donkey in
the main clause is contained in a situation (s2) which is part of a larger situation (s1)
in which a man owns a donkey, the beaten and owned donkeys must be the same.
However, if the meaning of a definite bare nouns is ‘the unique P in s,’ it should
allow covarying readings if situation-based binding can give rise to donkey anaphoric
interpretations, contrary to fact. Furthermore, the observation that indexical ex-
pressions are required in such examples supports the idea that donkey anaphora are
interpreted with the aid of semantic indices.13
12 I have simplified Elbourne’s analysis for purposes of space. I hope I have not misrepresented that
analysis in so doing.
13 See Schlenker 2011 for related facts and arguments from donkey anaphora in signed languages.
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It is worth mentioning that donkey sentences involving indistinguishable par-
ticipants — including sage-plant sentences and bishop-sentences (e.g., Heim 1990;
Kadmon 1990; Elbourne 2010) — behave as expected on the basis of the general-
ization above: they require indexical noun phrases and prohibit bare nominals. Of
course, it is not surprising that these examples behave as familiar rather than unique
definites given that they are the limiting cases for uniqueness theories.
However, some donkey sentences do seem to allow bare nouns as donkey
anaphora. In particular, donkey sentences which have been observed to favor weak
or existential readings (Chierchia 1995: 63) allow bare nominals:
(26) [thúk
every
khon
CLF:person
thîi
REL
mii
have
bàt-khredìt1
credit-card
] chái
use
bàt1
card
/
/
(??man)
it
càay-N@@n.
pay
‘Everyone who had a credit card used it to pay.’
The underlined donkey anaphor in (27) is weak in the sense that each person only
needs to use one credit card for the sentence to be true, even if they have several
credit cards in their wallet. Thus, the indefinite and donkey anaphor seem to be
bound by a single existential quantifier.
I contend that the bare noun in the second clause of (27) is not actually a donkey
anaphor; it is not bound. This is because the truth of this sentence does not depend on
whether people pay the bill with their own credit cards. Instead, the truth conditions
are closer to the sentence Everyone who had a credit card used a credit card to pay.
While people tend to pay with their own credit cards, these sentences allows for the
two credit cards to be different.
The same is true for the following case of covariation under part-whole bridging,
which are alleged to provide evidence for situation-based binding of uniqueness
definites by Schwarz (2009: 174):
(27) [thúk
every
khon
CLF:person
thîi
REL
s1´1
buy
bâan1
house
] tOˆON
must
som
fix
laˇNkhaa
roof
(bâan nán).
house that
‘Everyone who bought a house had to fix a (the) roof.’
The most natural reading of this example is one where everyone bought houses
whose roofs were in need of repair. The roof mentioned in the consequent is related
to the house in the antecedent by a part-whole relationship, and as such, it is licensed
as a uniqueness definite by virtue of part-whole bridging. However, unless the
modifier bâan nán ‘(of) that house’ is included, the sentence allows an unbound
reading of ‘roof’ in which people were required to fix some roof in order to buy a
house which was not necessarily beneath the roof they fixed. Note that there is still
covariation in this interpretation: each house-buyer fixes a different roof, but there is
no binding.
I conclude that indexical expressions are necessary to achieve donkey anaphoric
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interpretations in numeral classifier languages. This conclusion poses problem for
the uniqueness-based analysis of Elbourne 2013, which incorrectly predicts that the
uniqueness-based bare nouns should be available as donkey anaphora, contrary to
fact. This conclusion is somewhat stronger than that of Schwarz (2009), who argues
that both dynamic binding and situation-based binding can give rise to covarying
interpretations of definites.
5 Conclusion
I hope to have shown that the distinction in definite semantics observed by Schwarz
(2009) for German articles can be extended to different classes of nominals in
numeral classifier languages despite the fact that these languages lack definite
articles. While bare nouns are used for unique definites, familiar definites must make
use of indexical expressions, including demonstratives and overt pronouns. This
generalization was extended to account for the distinction between functional and
indexical definites proposed by Chierchia (1992, 1995), and offered an explanation
for Kurafuji’s (1999) observation that null versus overt pronouns have different
semantic properties, with null pronouns as the pronominal correlate of bare nouns.
With Schwarz (2009), I conclude that both familiarity and uniqueness are neces-
sary components in an empirically adequate theory of definiteness. In addition, the
semantically contentful notion of ‘familiarity’ might be just discourse anaphoricity,
modeled with dynamic indices. Numeral classifier languages provide striking con-
firmation for a semantics with indices given that the expressions which are used in
familiar contexts are the same expressions that can be used for pointing, as in signed
languages (Schlenker 2011). Finally, the uniqueness-based approaches to donkey
anaphora proposed by Heim (1990) and Elbourne (2013) do not predict the right
distribution of definite expressions in these languages. The strongest interpretation
of these facts is that covarying interpretations of nominals cannot be achieved by the
binding of situation variables in natural language.
References
Abbott, Barbara. 1999. Support for a unique theory of definiteness. In Tanya
Matthews & Devon Strolovitch (eds.), Semantics and Linguistic Theory (SALT)
9, 1–15.
Aguilar-Guevara, Ana & Joost Zwarts. 2010. Weak definites and reference to kinds.
In Nan Li & David Lutz (eds.), Semantics and Linguistic Theory (SALT) 20,
179–196.
Arkoh, Ruby & Lisa Matthewson. 2013. A familiar definite article in Akan. Lingua
123. 1–30. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.lingua.2012.09.012.
120
Two kinds of definites in numeral classifier languages
Barker, Chris. 2005. Possessive weak definites. In Ji yung Kim, Yury A. Lander
& Barbara H. Partee (eds.), Possessives and Beyond: Semantics and Synax,
Amherst, MA: GLSA Publications.
Barlew, Jefferson. 2014. Salience, uniqueness, and the definite determiner -tè in
Bulu. In Todd Snider, Sarah D’Antonio & Mia Weigand (eds.), Semantics and
Linguistic Theory (SALT) 24, 619–639.
Birner, Betty J. & Gregory Ward. 1994. Uniqueness, familiarity, and the definite
article in English. In Berkeley Linguistic Society (BLS) 20, 93–102.
Carlson, Gregory, Rachel Sussman, Natalie Klein & Michael Tananhaus. 2006.
Weak definite noun phrases. In Chris Davis, Amy Rose Deal & Youri Zabbal
(eds.), Northe East Linguistic Society (NELS) 36, 179–196. GLSA.
Chen, Ping. 2004. Identifiability and definiteness in Chinese. Linguistics 42(5).
1129–1184.
Cheng, Lisa L.-S. & Rint Sybesma. 1999. Bare and not-so-bare nouns and the
structure of NP. Linguistic Inquiry 30. 509–542.
Chierchia, Gennaro. 1992. Anaphora and dynamic binding. Linguistics and Philos-
ophy 15. 111–183.
Chierchia, Gennaro. 1995. Dynamics of Meaning. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Chierchia, Gennaro. 1998. Reference to kinds across languages. Natural Language
Semantics 6. 339–405.
Cooper, Robin. 1995. The role of situations in generalized quantifiers. In Shalom
Lappin (ed.), Handbook of Contemporary Semantic Theory, Malden, MA: Black-
well.
Dayal, V. 2004. Number marking and (in)definiteness in kind terms. Linguistics and
Philosophy 27. 393–450.
Dayal, Veneeta. 2011. Bare noun phrases. In Claudia Maienborn, Klaus von
Heusinger, & Paul Portner (eds.), Semantics: An International Handbook of
Natural Language Meaning, vol. 2, 1088–1109. Mouton de Gruyter.
Dayal, Veneeta. 2012. Bangla classifiers: Mediating between kinds and objects.
Rivista di Linguistica 24(2). 195–226.
Elbourne, Paul. 2010. On bishop sentences. Natural Language Semantics 18. 65–78.
Elbourne, Paul. 2013. Definite Descriptions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Evans, Gareth. 1977. Pronouns, quantifiers, and relative clauses (I). Canadian
Journal of Philosophy 7. 476–536.
Evans, Gareth. 1980. Pronouns. Linguistic Inquiry 11(2). 337–362.
Geach, Peter. 1962. Reference and Generality. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Greenberg, Joseph H. 1978. Generalizations about numeral systems. In Joseph H.
Greenberg (ed.), Universals of Human Language Volume 3: Word Structure,
249–297. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
121
Peter Jenks
Groenendijk, Jeroen & Martin Stokhof. 1991. Dynamic predicate logic. Linguistics
and Philosophy 14. 39–100.
Grosz, Patrick & Pritty Patel. To appear. Revisiting pronominal typology. Linguistic
Inquiry .
Hawkins, John A. 1978. Definiteness and Indefiniteness: A Study in Reference and
Grammaticality Prediction. London: Croon Helm.
Heim, Irene. 1982. The Semantics of Definite and Indefinite Noun Phrases: Univer-
sity of Massachusetts, Amherst, PhD dissertation.
Heim, Irene. 1990. E-type pronouns and donkey anaphora. Linguistics and Philoso-
phy 13. 137–177.
Jenks, Peter. 2011. The Hidden Structure of Thai Noun Phrases: Harvard University,
PhD dissertation.
Jenks, Peter. 2015. Patterns of definiteness without articles. Ms., UC Berkeley.
Jiang, Li. 2012. Nominal Arguments and Language Variation: Harvard University,
PhD dissertation.
Kadmon, Nirit. 1990. Uniqueness. Linguistics and Philosophy 13. 273–324.
Kamp, Hans. 1981. A theory of truth and semantic representation. In J. A. G.
Groenendijk, T. M. V. Janssen & M. J. B. Stokhof (eds.), Formal Methods in the
Study of Language, Amsterdam: Mathematical Centre.
Karttunen, Lauri. 1969. Pronouns and variables. In Robert I. Binnick, Alice Davison,
Georgia M. Green & Jerry L. Morgan (eds.), Chicago Linguistics Society (CLS)
6, 108–115. Chicago: Department of Linguistics, University of Chicago.
Kim, Chonghyuck. 2005. The Korean Plural Marker tul and its Implications:
University of Delaware, PhD dissertation.
Kratzer, Angelika. 1989. An investigation of the lumps of thought. Linguistics and
Philosophy 12. 607–653.
Kratzer, Angelika. 2007. Situations in natural language semantics. In E. N. Zalta
(ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, CSLI.
Krifka, Manfred. 1995. Common nouns: A contrastive analysis of Chinese and
English. In Gregory N. Carlson & Francis Jeffry Pelletier (eds.), The Generic
Book, 393–411. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Krifka, Manfred. 2003. Bare NPs: Kind-referring, indefinites, both, or neither?
In Robert B. Young & Yuping Zhou (eds.), Semantics and Linguistic Theory
(SALT) 13, 180–203.
Kurafuji, Takeo. 1998. Dynamic binding and the E-type strategy: Evidence from
Japanese. In Devon Strolovitch & Aaron Lawson (eds.), Semantics and Linguistic
Theory (SALT) 8, 129–144.
Kurafuji, Takeo. 1999. Japanese Pronouns in Dynamic Semantics: The Null/Overt
Contrast: Rutgers University, PhD dissertation.
Kurafuji, Takeo. 2004. Plural morphemes, definiteness, and the notion of semantic
122
Two kinds of definites in numeral classifier languages
parameter. Language and Linguistics 5(1). 211–242.
Lee, Chungmin. 1995. Definiteness and specificity. Linguistics in the Morning Calm
(Selected papers from SICOL-1992) 3. 663–677.
Li, XuPing. 2013. Numeral Classifiers in Chinese: The Syntax-Semantics Interface.
Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
Li, XuPing & Walter Bisang. 2012. Classifiers in Sinitic languages: From individu-
ation to definiteness-marking. Lingua 122. 335–355.
Löbner, Sebastian. 1985. Definites. Journal of Semantics 4. 279–326.
Piriyawiboon, Nattaya. 2010. Classifiers and Determiner-less Languages: The Case
of Thai: University of Toronto, PhD dissertation.
Poesio, Massimo. 1994. Weak definites. In Mandy Harvey & Lynn Santelmann
(eds.), Proceedings of Semantics and Linguistic Theory (SALT) 4, 282–299.
Cornell University Press.
Poesio, Massimo & Renata Viera. 1998. A corpus-based investigation of definite
description use. Computational Linguistics 24. 183–216.
Prince, Ellen F. 1981. Toward a taxonomy of given/new information. In Peter Cole
(ed.), Radical Pragmatics, Academic Press.
Prince, Ellen F. 1992. The ZPG letter: Subjects, definiteness, and information-status.
In Sandra Thompson & William Mann (eds.), Discourse Description: Diverse
Analyses of a Fundraising Text, 295–325. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Roberts, Craige. 2002. Demonstratives as definites. In Kees van Deemter & Rodger
Kibble (eds.), Information Sharing: Reference and Presupposition in Language
Generation and Interpretation, 89–136. Stanford, CA: CSLI.
Roberts, Craige. 2003. Uniqueness in definite noun phrases. Linguistics and
Philosophy 26. 287–350.
Roberts, Craige. 2004. Pronouns as definites. In Marga Reimer & Anne Bezuiden-
hout (eds.), Descriptions and Beyond, 503–543. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Russell, Bertrand. 1905. On denoting. Mind 14. 479–493.
Schlenker, Philippe. 2011. Donkey anaphora: the view from sign language (ASL
and LSF). Linguistics and Philosophy 34. 341–395.
Schwarz, Florian. 2009. Two Types of Definites in Natural Language: University of
Massachusetts, Amherst, PhD dissertation.
Schwarz, Florian. 2012. Situation pronouns in Determiner Phrases. Natural Lan-
guage Semantics 20. 431–475.
Schwarz, Florian. 2013. Two kinds of definites cross-linguistically. Language and
Linguistics Compass 7(10). 534–559.
Schwarz, Florian. 2014. How weak and how definite are weak definites? In Ana
Aguilar-Guevara, Bert Le Bruyn & Joost Zwarts (eds.), Weak Referentiality,
213–235. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
123
Peter Jenks
Simpson, A. 2005. Classifiers and DP structure in Southeast Asia. In Guglielmo
Cinque & Richard Kayne (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Syntax,
806–838. Oxford University Press.
Trinh, Tue. 2011. Nominal reference in two classifier languages. In Ingo Reich
(ed.), Sinn und Bedeutung 15, 629–644.
Wu, Yicheng & Adams Bodomo. 2009. Classifiers 6= determiners. Linguistic Inquiry
40. 487–503.
Yang, Rong. 2001. Common Nouns, Classifiers, and Quantification in Chinese:
Rutgers University, PhD dissertation.
Peter Jenks
1203 Dwinelle Hall
UC Berkeley
Berkeley, CA 94720-2650
jenks@berkeley.edu
124
